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1Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies, and Real Options
Abstract
Given an owner’s noncommitment timing strategy and a manager’s hidden action, we
consider how the optimal compensation contract for the manager is designed and how
the corresponding timing decisions to launch the project and replace the manager are
determined. Using a real options approach, we show that in comparison with the ﬁrst-
best case, the higher (lower)-quality project is launched later (at the same time as the
ﬁrst-best case), whereas the incumbent manager is replaced earlier. We also indicate that
compared with the case of the owner’s commitment timing strategy and the manager’s
hidden action, the higher (lower)-quality project is launched later (at the same time as
the ﬁrst-best case), whereas the incumbent manager is (is not necessarily) replaced later
if the hidden-action problem is severe enough (is not severe enough). Unlike the folklore
result of the standard moral hazard model, severance pay may serve to minimize the com-
pensation for the manager’s loss of his option value caused by loss of corporate control
by committing the owner to delaying replacement of the manager if the hidden-action
problem is not too severe.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D82, G30, G34, M51, M52.
Keywords: CEO turnover, executive compensation, noncommitment, real options, sev-
erance pay.
21. Introduction
In the corporate ﬁrm, timing of the commencement of the project and the replacement
of the manager is often determined according to ex post economic situations. These ex
post decisions are often chosen by an owner such as a venture capitalist, private equity
fund, banks when a ﬁrm is being restructured, management buyout (MBO) ﬁrms, founder
families or large dominant shareholders even in old established ﬁrms. In this case, if the
manager needs to make a costly eﬀort or ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital investment before the
project starts, and if the eﬀort or investment is the manager’s private information (hid-
den action), the owner needs to design a managerial compensation contract that gives
the manager an incentive to make an appropriate eﬀort or investment. However, if the
owner cannot precommit to the ex post timing decision to launch the project or to replace
the manager, she may choose these ex post timing decisions opportunistically after the
manager makes a costly eﬀort or investment.1 Furthermore, because the compensation
contract is determined before the timing strategies are executed,2 the contract will also
aﬀect the owner’s timing decisions in addition to the manager’s costly eﬀort or investment.
Hence, when the managerial compensation contract needs to be designed in the case of
the owner’s noncommitment timing strategy and the manager’s moral hazard problem
(abbreviated to the ‘noncommitment timing’ case), the eﬀect of the compensation con-
tract on the owner’s timing strategy needs to be considered, unlike the standard static
contracting model that focuses on the interrelation between the compensation contract
and the agent’s costly eﬀort.
In this paper, under the noncommitment timing case, we explore how the optimal
compensation contract is designed and how the corresponding timing decisions to launch
the project and replace the manager are determined. The main questions this paper
1We have many practical examples in which the planned timing of project commencement is advanced
or delayed, and where unpredicted replacement of the manager occurs.
2For example, even in the recent ﬁnancial crisis, many distressed ﬁnancial institutions attempted to
give predetermined compensation to their executives until the government and taxpayers criticized the
amount of predetermined executive compensation as excessive.
3addresses are:
(i) Compared with the ﬁrst-best case, is the project launched earlier or later? In addition,
is the manager replaced earlier or later?
(ii) Compared with the case of the owner’s commitment timing strategy and the manager’s
moral hazard problem (abbreviated to the ‘commitment timing’ case), is the project
launched earlier or later? In addition, is the manager replaced earlier or later?
(iii) Can the manager receive both on-the-job incentive pay and severance pay, unlike the
folklore result of the standard moral hazard model?3
To achieve this objective, in this paper, we consider the owner’s noncommitment timing
decisions to launch the project and replace the manager in the class of ﬁrms with a
stochastic trend by extending the real options framework of Grenadier and Wang (2005)
and Hori and Osano (2009). The commencement of the project needs a setup cost,
which is regarded as sunk. As argued in the management literature, the replacement of
the manager is equivalent to a signiﬁcant strategy change by the ﬁrm.4 The strategy
change involves spending large amounts on various adjustment costs, which can also be
regarded as sunk. These sunk costs make the decisions regarding project commencement
and managerial replacement irreversible. We also suppose that the costly speciﬁch u m a n
capital investment of the incumbent manager aﬀects the likelihood of drawing a higher (or
lower)-quality project, which determines the growth rate of the ﬁrm under the stochastic
environment. For example, the manager may improve his management ability, engage
in product innovation, or make improvements to existing production facilities. However,
3The standard moral hazard model cannot explain why the manager receives both on-the-job incentive
pay and severance pay. In the corporate governance literature, the same remark also holds. The exceptions
are Almazan and Suarez (2003) and Inderst and Mueller (2006), which show that the combination of
some degree of entrenchment and a sizeable severance package is desirable. Lambert and Larcker (1985),
Knoeber (1986), Harris (1990) and Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) attribute a similar role to golden
parachutes in hostile tender oﬀers.
4The management literature provides ample evidence that strategy changes are accompanied by the
hiring of a new manager (see Hambrick, Geletkanycz and Fredrickson (1993), Baker and Duhaime (1997)
and Gordon et al. (2000)), while CEO succession is one of the primary means by which ﬁrms adapt
to major changes in their environments (see Tushman, Newman and Romanelli (1986) and Wiersema
(1992)).
4the manager’s investment decision is a hidden action. Thus, the owner needs to design
a managerial compensation contract contingent on project quality in order to induce the
manager to choose the eﬃcient level of investment under agency problems. In fact, we
suppose that the owner cannot precommit to the timing decision to launch the project or
to replace the manager before the manager makes a costly investment. Thus, the owner
also has an incentive to choose the timing of the launch of the project and replacement
of the manager opportunistically.
The ﬁrst main result of this paper relates to the eﬃciency of the timing decisions to
launch the project and to replace the manager. Compared with the ﬁrst-best case, the
higher-quality project is launched later, whereas the lower-quality project is launched at
t h es a m et i m ea st h eﬁrst-best case. Furthermore, the incumbent manager is replaced
earlier.
The second main result is concerned with the eﬀect of the noncommitment timing
strategy. Compared with the case of the commitment timing case, the higher-quality
project is launched later, whereas the lower-quality project is launched at the same time
as the ﬁrst-best case. In addition, the incumbent manager is (or is not necessarily)
replaced later if the manager’s moral hazard problem is severe (or not severe enough).
The third main result is about severance pay. If the severity of the manager’s moral
hazard problem is not too great, the owner may make a positive severance payment.
Severance pay can become an instrument that commits the owner to replacing the manager
later in order to minimize compensation for the loss of the manager’s option value at the
loss of corporate control. Thus, unlike the standard moral hazard model, our approach
clariﬁe st h en e wr o l eo fs e v e r a n c ep a yt h a tw o r k st h r o u g hac h a n g ei nt h em a n a g e r ’ s
option value.
The reasoning behind these main results is explained as follows. First, suppose that the
manager’s moral hazard problem is severe. Under the noncommitment timing strategy,
the owner must consider the eﬀects of the compensation contract on the trigger levels for
commencement of the project and replacement of the manager because the owner cannot
5be committed to the ex ante promised triggers. However, a positive nonsuccess reward
(positive severance pay) for the manager is not only recognized as a sunk cost at the start
of the project (at the replacement of the manager) from the owner’s ex post viewpoint,
but also prevents the manager from choosing a higher level of investment. Thus, in the
compensation contract components, the owner utilizes a success reward for the manager
as an incentive to motivate the manager to choose the higher level of investment.
However, under the noncommitment timing case, the owner regards the success reward
as an additional sunk cost at the start of the higher-quality project from her ex post
viewpoint. Because the option value of the owner waiting to launch the project must
then be even larger, she is forced to launch the higher-quality project later under the
noncommitment timing case than under the ﬁrst-best case or under the commitment
timing case.5 By contrast, as the owner never utilizes the nonsuccess reward, it cannot
be regarded as a sunk cost at the start of the project. Hence, the owner can launch the
lower-quality project at the ﬁrst-best time, which is the same as under the commitment
timing case.
On the other hand, the replacement trigger, as well as the manager’s reward for success,
can become an important incentive device. This is because the early replacement of the
manager can directly increase the loss of his option value at his replacement, thereby
serving to motivate him to select the higher level of investment. Thus, even though the
severance pay is not used in the optimal contract, the owner replaces the incumbent
manager earlier under the noncommitment timing case than under the ﬁrst-best case.
However, if the manager’s moral hazard problem is severe enough, the incumbent manager
is replaced later under the noncommitment timing case than the commitment case. This
is because the optimal replacement trigger under the commitment timing case is too
low for the owner after the manager chooses the level of investment. Hence, replacing
the incumbent manager later is more desirable under the noncommitment timing case.
5Note that under the commitment timing case, the owner simultaneously chooses the compensation
contract and timing decisions so that they are determined orthogonally. Hence, the owner never regards
any of the compensation contract components as a sunk cost even though she utilizes it as an incentive
device.
6On the other hand, if the manager’s moral hazard problem is not severe enough, the
optimal replacement trigger under the commitment timing case may be too high from
the owner’s ex post viewpoint. This implies that, from the owner’s ex post viewpoint,
replacing the incumbent manager earlier is more desirable. Then, it is possible that the
incumbent manager is replaced earlier under the noncommitment timing case than under
the commitment case.
Second, if the manager’s moral hazard problem is not too severe, the results of the
commencement triggers of the higher- and lower-quality projects are the same as those
attained if the manager’s moral hazard problem is severe enough, for the reasons argued
above. However, to reduce the ﬁxed base salary in this case, the owner now has an
additional ex ante incentive to minimize compensation for the loss of the option value
incurred by the manager at his replacement. Because the later replacement of the manager
can reduce this compensation, the owner may make a positive severance payment in order
to commit herself to delaying the replacement of the incumbent manager if she has an ex
post incentive to replace the manager earlier.
This paper is related to the literature that extends the real options model to account for
the issues of agency and information in corporations. Grenadier and Wang (2005) provided
a model of investment timing with both moral hazard and information asymmetries, and
analyzed the optimal contract problem.6 Hori and Osano (2009) extended the model
of Grenadier and Wang (2005), and discussed the timing of the decision to replace the
manager as an endogenous incentive mechanism. However, these two papers investigate
the situation in which the owner can precommit to the triggers promised before the
manager makes costly investments.7 As a result, these two papers suggest that if it
is only the manager’s hidden action that causes the agency problem, both higher- and
6McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) are the pioneers in the ﬁeld of investment
timing under the real options approach.
7Hori and Osano (2009) also considered the possibility of renegotiation of the contract agreements
and trigger strategies and characterized the renegotiation-proof contract, extending the framework of
Fudenberg and Tirole (1990). Hori and Osano showed that all the triggers are ﬁxed at the ﬁrst-best
levels under the renegotiation-proof contract. However, Hori and Osano still assume that the owner is
committed to the renegotiated triggers after renegotiation.
7lower-quality projects are launched at the ﬁrst-best time. In addition, Hori and Osano
indicate that if it is only the manager’s hidden action that causes the agency problem,
the incumbent manager is replaced earlier under the optimal contract than under the
ﬁrst-best situation, although he receives no severance pay. By contrast, our present paper
shows that (i) a higher-quality project is launched later under the optimal contract than
under the ﬁrst-best situation, although a lower-quality project is launched at the ﬁrst-
best time; (ii) the incumbent manager is still replaced prior to the ﬁrst-best time, but is
replaced even later under the noncommitment timing strategy when the manager’s moral
hazard problem is severe; and (iii) the optimal severance pay may be positive.
In Grenadier and Wang (2005) and Hori and Osano (2009), the owner need not consider
the eﬀects of the compensation contract on the trigger levels because she can precommit
to the ex ante promised triggers. Hence, it is eﬃcient for the owner to start the higher-
quality project at the ﬁrst-best time because the success reward does not aﬀect the trigger.
On the other hand, in Hori and Osano (2009), the earlier replacement, as well as the man-
ager’s reward for success, becomes an important incentive mechanism because it directly
increases the loss of the option value to the manager on his replacement. Hence, the
incumbent manager is replaced prior to the ﬁrst-best time, although he receives no sev-
erance pay. By contrast, in our present model, the owner must consider the eﬀects of
the compensation contract on the trigger levels because she cannot precommit to the ex
ante promised triggers. Thus, the owner is forced to start the higher-quality project after
the ﬁrst-best time in order to motivate the manager through the success reward because
she regards the success reward as an additional sunk cost at the start of the project from
her ex post viewpoint. Furthermore, if the manager’s moral hazard incentive is great
enough, the incumbent manager is replaced even later under the noncommitment timing
strategy because optimal replacement under the commitment timing strategy is too early
for the owner after the manager chooses the level of investment. On the other hand, if the
manager’s moral hazard incentive is not great, the owner may make a positive severance
payment in order to minimize the compensation for the manager’s loss of his option value
8when he is replaced.
T h ep r o b l e mw ea n a l y z ei sa l s or e l a t e dt ot h el i t e r a t u r et h a te x t e n d st h er e a lo p t i o n s
model to explain governance issues. Morellec (2004) and Lambrecht and Myers (2007)
discussed corporate governance issues, such as optimal capital structure and takeovers.
Dangl, Wu and Zechner (2008) also investigated how internal manager replacement and
product market discipline interplay in a mutual fund company, although the managerial
compensation contract is exogenously given. In addition, in their model, the replacement
trigger is not used as an incentive instrument for motivating the manager. In fact, our
paper is the ﬁrst to examine how the optimal compensation contract and timing decisions
on project launch and manager replacement are simultaneously determined within a real
options framework if the owner cannot precommit to her timing decisions.8
With a static model of boards of directors, Almazan and Suarez (2003) suggested that
severance pay plays a crucial role in solving a commitment problem by dissuading share-
holders with strong boards from being too likely to replace a diligent manager or by
dissuading an unsatisfactory manager from resisting being replaced by weak boards. In-
derst and Mueller (2006) also indicated that severance pay reduces the manager’s incentive
to entrench himself. In a model of the optimal termination of a long-term contract, Spear
a n dW a n g( 2 0 0 5 )s h o w e dt h a tt h ea g e n tm u s tb eﬁr e dw h e nh eb e c o m e st o or i c ht ob e
motivated to work diligently, and that if the agent is ﬁred, he needs to be given a severance
payment in order to be compensated for his promised utility. As the agent’s replacement
happens when his utility has an income eﬀect, the role of severance pay in Spear and
Wang depends on the degree of risk aversion of the agent.
In contrast to these studies, in our paper, severance pay can induce the owner to commit
herself to delaying replacement of the manager in order to minimize compensation for the
loss of the manager’s option value at replacement of corporate control. Thus, in the
present model, the role of severance pay is created by the owner’s commitment problem
8Hori and Osano (2008) examined the optimal compensation contract problem in which the manager
chooses the timing of investment under agency conﬂicts and showed that restricted stock has an advantage
over stock options.
9when determining the timing of a decision to replace the manager. Furthermore, in our
model, the role of severance pay does not depend on the degree of risk aversion of the
manager. Hence, our paper is complementary to these studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3, as a benchmark, derives the ﬁrst-best solution that corresponds to the standard
real options case. Section 4 ﬁrst examines the optimal timing decisions of the owner
under agency conﬂicts, given the compensation contract, and then obtains the optimal
compensation contract. The ﬁnal section concludes the paper. Proofs of all propositions
and lemmas are provided in Appendix A.
2. The Basic Environment
The basic setting of the model is similar to that of Hori and Osano (2009). We consider a
ﬁrm that is entirely equity ﬁnanced. There are three agents with risk-neutral preferences:
an owner, an incumbent manager and new managers. The risk-free rate is r,a tw h i c h
investors may lend and borrow freely.
The owner oﬀers a managerial contract to the incumbent manager at time zero and
then chooses the time at which the manager commences a project and the time at which
the manager is replaced by a new manager. The latter time may be interpreted as the
time at which the owner is forced to make a project change. The ﬁrm incurs a setup cost,
K, if a project is commenced, and a ﬁring cost (exclusive of the severance payment), CF,
if the manager is replaced.9 These adjustment costs make the decisions regarding project
commencement and managerial replacement irreversible.
The ﬁrm is run by the incumbent manager, who has no personal ﬁnancial resources,
a reservation utility of zero and limited liability. The manager incurs a cost in terms
of the loss of corporate control CL if he is ﬁred. The manager derives control beneﬁts
from retaining his oﬃce, and CL is a measure of the loss of these control beneﬁts or the
9This is equivalent to assuming that there are several costs involved in the transition process and the
corporate strategy change when the manager is replaced.
10disutility cost that the manager incurs by losing the prestige of the managerial position
or being forced to seek new employment.
The incumbent manager has a project that yields an instantaneous cash ﬂow:
R =( X + θi)Y, (1)
where X is a deterministic component, θi is a component that depends on an action
related to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital investment made by the manager and Y is a
stochastic component. θi takes on two possible values, θ1 or θ2,w i t hθ1 > 0 > θ2.I n
addition, we assume that X + θ2 > 0.
The incumbent manager aﬀects the probability of drawing θ1 or θ2 by investing in ﬁrm-
speciﬁch u m a nc a p i t a lh (= H or L)a tt i m ez e r o . I ft h em a n a g e rm a k e si n v e s t m e n th
= H, he incurs an eﬀort cost CE, but the probability of drawing θ1 (or θ2)e q u a l sqH (or
1−qH).10 If the manager chooses h = L, he incurs no costs but decreases the probability
of drawing θ1 from qH to qL.N o t et h a t1 >q H >q L > 0.
Let the value of Y evolve as a geometric Brownian motion:
dY = αYd t+ σYd z, (2)
where α ∈ [(1/2)σ2,r) is the instantaneous conditional expected percentage change in
Y per unit of time, σ > 0 is the instantaneous conditional standard deviation per unit
of time and dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process (dz ∼ N (0,dt)). The
restriction on the value of α ensures that the ﬁrm is growing.11
If the owner ﬁres the incumbent manager, she hires a new manager from the pool of
candidate successors. For simplicity, we assume that the ﬁrm’s instantaneous cash ﬂow
is the same for any new manager, and that θi =0after the ﬁrm hires a new manager.12
10This may correspond to the case in which the manager improves management systems, engages in
product innovation, or makes improvements to existing production facilities.
11Note that d(E logY )=( α − 1
2σ2)dt using Ito’s Lemma, where E is the expectation operator.
12Similar assumptions were used in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Hermalin (2005) and Inderst and
11Hence, the ﬁrm’s instantaneous cash ﬂow under a new manager is
R = XY. (3)
Because the ﬁrm’s instantaneous cash ﬂow is the same for any new manager, the ﬁrm
does not replace any new manager after replacing the incumbent manager. In addition,
as θ1 > 0, the incumbent manager is never ﬁred if he is known to draw θ1.T h u s , w e
only consider the replacement of the incumbent manager with θi = θ2. This implies that
a new manager can pull the bad performance ﬁrm together after the replacement of the
incumbent manager with θi = θ2.
We assume that the incumbent manager’s choice of h is his private information (i.e., it
is a hidden action), and that the contracting parties can observe the stochastic component
of the ﬁrm’s instantaneous cash ﬂow, Y ,a sw e l la st h eﬁrm’s whole instantaneous cash
ﬂow, R, but cannot verify Y or R to the third parties. In addition, the contracting parties
can observe the project quality (i.e., θi) soon after the manager invests, and verify θi to the
third parties once the project is started. The unveriﬁability assumption about Y and R
can be reasonable if the ﬁrm is a venture ﬁrm, a restructuring ﬁrm or a private ﬁrm. The
veriﬁability assumption about θi can be justiﬁed if the contracting parties cannot verify
whether the manager succeeds in improving management systems, establishing product
innovation or making improvements to existing production facilities until the project is
started. All other variables, including the timing of the decision to start the project or
replace the manager, are publicly observed, and the probability, (qH,q L),a n dt h ed i ﬀusion
process of Y are common knowledge.
Because the incumbent manager’s choice of h is his private information, the owner needs
to motivate him to make investment h = H at time zero by oﬀe r i n gh i mac o m p e n s a t i o n
contract that commits the owner to paying him at the commencement of the project
Mueller (2006). The assumption that the new manager cannot be hired by the ﬁrm at time 0 can be
justiﬁed if the incumbent manager only has the ability to start the project or if the new manager only
undertakes the activities after the project starts.
12a n da tt h et i m eo fh i sr e p l a c e m e n t . 13 Speciﬁcally, the owner can make the compensation
contract conditional upon the veriﬁable component of the project’s value at the time the
project starts (performance pay) and the time the manager is replaced (severance pay).
As h has only two possible values, we focus on compensation contracts that yield the
incumbent manager a ﬁxed base pay of W0 at time zero,14 ap a y m e n to fWi (i =1 ,2) if
the project is exercised and the project quality, θi,i sv e r i ﬁed, and a severance pay of S if
the manager is replaced. Note that W0 cannot be contingent on the project quality at time
0 because the project quality cannot be veriﬁed until the project starts. Also, note that
only the manager with θi = θ2 is ﬁred because θ1 > 0 implies that the manager with θi =
θ1 is never ﬁred. W1 (W2) may be interpreted as a reward for success (nonsuccess) paid
to the incumbent manager. Because a new manager does not have a choice of investment,
we can set his compensation, WN,e q u a lt o0 to simplify the analysis.
The equilibrium of the game is given as follows. (i) At time zero, the owner oﬀers a
compensation contract, (W0,W 1,W 2,S), to the incumbent manager in order to maximize
her option value. The manager chooses whether to make investment h = H or h = L
in order to maximize his option value. (ii) After the manager chooses h = H or h = L,
the owner pays W0 and determines the timings of the project’s commencement and of the
manager’s replacement. (iii) If the project is exercised, the owner pays Wi, conditional
on θi, to the incumbent manager. (iv) If the incumbent manager with θi = θ2 is replaced,
the owner pays him S, and hires a new manager from the pool of candidate successors.
The main diﬀerence between the present model and the former agency model with
real options such as Grenadier and Wang (2005) and Hori and Osano (2009) is that the
owner cannot precommit to the timing decision of the project’s commencement or of
the manager’s replacement before the manager chooses the level of investment.15 Thus,
13Like Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Hermalin (2005), Grenadier and Wang (2005), Spear and Wang
(2005) and Inderst and Mueller (2006), we exclude the possibility of contract renegotiation. Hori and
Osano (2009) discuss the possibility of contract renegotiation when the owner can be committed to the
timing of the project’s commencement and the managerial replacement after renegotiation.
14Although Hori and Osano (2009) do not consider W0 in the compensation contract, the introduction
of W0 simpliﬁes the analysis without aﬀecting our main results.
15The owner’s noncommitment to the timing strategy is caused by the assumption that Y and R are
13the owner determines the timing of the project’s commencement and of the manager’s
replacement after the manager chooses h = H or h = L.









Assumption 3: The diﬀerences qH − qL and θ1 − θ2 are suﬃciently large so that it is
optimal to induce the manager to choose h = H both under the ﬁrst-best solution and
under the solution to the owner’s maximization problem in the hidden-action model.





∆q, is larger than the cost of the loss of corporate control incurred by
the manager. Unless this assumption is satisﬁed, there is no possibility of moral hazard
caused by the manager; thus, W1 = W2 = S =0becomes a solution. Assumption 2
implies that the ratio of the ﬁring cost to the setup cost for the owner is larger than the
loss ratio of the instantaneous cash ﬂow under the manager with θ2.A s v e r i ﬁed in the
subsequent sections, Assumption 2 ensures that the owner does not replace the incumbent
manager until the project starts.
3. First-best Solution (The Standard Real Options Case)
Before analyzing the equilibrium, we brieﬂyr e v i e wt h eﬁrst-best solution used as a
benchmark. The ﬁrst-best solution is derived by maximizing the option value to the owner
at time zero, provided that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital investment of the incumbent
manager is publicly observable and contractible, that the manager is compensated for
the loss of control beneﬁts, CL, and that the owner can precommit to the timing of the
project’s commencement and of the manager’s replacement before the manager chooses
the level of investment. To derive the ﬁrst-best solution, we use the backward induction
method. First, we analyze the owner’s option value with respect to the replacement of the
unveriﬁable so that the contract cannot stipulate the trigger points contingent on Y or R.
14incumbent manager with θ2, and then we discuss the owner’s option value with respect to
the commencement of the project for each θi (i =1 ,2). Finally, we consider the owner’s
option value at time zero.
Here, we summarize the results on the ﬁrst-best replacement trigger level and the
owner’s option value with respect to the replacement trigger.
Proposition 1: Let Y FB
r denote the ﬁrst-best trigger for the replacement of the incumbent


















− CF − CL
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This proposition suggests that, as Y must be high enough to compensate for CF + CL,
the owner does not replace the manager with θ2 until the ﬁr s tt i m ea tw h i c hY hits the
trigger Y FB
r . The intuitive reason is that there is an opportunity cost associated with
replacing the manager today that is created by irreversible replacement costs and the
uncertain future values of Y ; that is, the option value of waiting to replace the manager




exceeds the cost, CF + CL. This feature cannot be captured in the static model. Because
the higher Y FB
r corresponds to the replacement option being exercised at a later time,
the higher Y FB
r implies that the expected tenure of the manager becomes longer.
Next, we derive the results for the ﬁrst-best commencement trigger levels and the
corresponding owner’s option values with respect to the commencement triggers.
Proposition 2: (i) Let Y FB
c1 denote the ﬁrst-best trigger for the commencement of the























if Y< Y FB
c1 ,
(X+θ1)Y
r−α − K if Y FB
c1 ≤ Y.
(7)
(ii) Let Y FB
c2 denote the ﬁrst-best trigger for the commencement of the project when θi =
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XY
r−α − CF − CL
if Y< Y FB
c2 ,
if Y FB





This proposition indicates that if θi = θ1, the owner does not start the project until the
ﬁrst time that Y reaches the trigger Y FB
c1 ,a n dt h a ti fθi = θ2, the owner neither starts
the project until Y ﬁrst hits the trigger Y FB
c2 nor replaces the manager until Y ﬁrst hits
the trigger Y FB
r . The intuitive reason is that there is an opportunity cost associated with
launching the project today that is created by the irreversible setup cost and the uncertain
future values of Y ; that is, the option value of waiting to launch the project implies an




the cost, K.B e c a u s e t h e h i g h e r Y ∗
ci corresponds to the commencement option being
exercised at a later time, the higher Y ∗
ci implies that the project starts later.
Several remarks on Propositions 1 and 2 are in order. First, it follows from Assumption
2t h a tY FB
c2 <YFB
r . Hence, under the ﬁrst-best solution, the owner does not replace the
incumbent manager until the project starts. Second, the ﬁrst-best timing of the project’s
16commencement and the manager’s replacement do not depend on the initial value of Y0
because of the time-consistent structure of our model. Hence, the ﬁrst-best timings are
determined independently of time, regardless of when the decisions are made.
4. The Optimal Compensation Contract and Trigger Strategies
In this section, we discuss the optimal compensation contract and trigger strategies
under the moral hazard model given in Section 2, provided that the ﬁrm-speciﬁch u m a n
capital investment of the incumbent manager is privately observed only by the manager
and that the owner cannot precommit to timing the project’s commencement or the man-
ager’s replacement before the manager chooses the level of investment. In the subsequent
analysis, we again work backwards to derive the optimal compensation contract and trig-
ger strategies. First, taking the compensation contract as given, we explore the owner’s
maximization problem with respect to the trigger points for launching the project and
replacing the incumbent manager, and then examine the owner’s maximization problem
with respect to the compensation contract at time zero under the moral hazard incentive
of the incumbent manager.
4.1. The optimal trigger strategy and the owner’s option value for a given
compensation contract.–
Here, we summarize our results for the optimal replacement trigger level and the owner’s
option value with respect to the replacement trigger.
Proposition 3: Let Y ∗
r denote the optimal trigger for the replacement of the incumbent
manager, and let ΠO
















¶β S + CF
β − 1
, (11)
where β is the same as that deﬁn e di nP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
17Several remarks are in order. First, this proposition implies that, as Y must be high
enough to compensate for S + CF, the owner does not replace the manager with θ2
until the ﬁr s tt i m ea tw h i c hY hits the trigger Y ∗
r . The intuitive reason is similar to that
given below Proposition 1. Second, because the higher Y ∗
r corresponds to the replacement
option being exercised at a later time, the higher Y ∗
r implies that the expected tenure of
the manager becomes longer. Third, an increase in S increases the noncommitment trigger
point of Y ∗
r . Because the owner cannot be committed to the ex ante promised replacement
trigger, she regards the severance payment S as a sunk cost on the replacement of the
manager in addition to the ﬁring cost CF. Thus, the owner delays the replacement of the
manager if S increases.
Next, we derive our results for the optimal commencement trigger levels and the owner’s
option values with respect to the commencement triggers.
Proposition 4: (i) Let Y ∗
c1 denote the optimal trigger for the commencement of the
project when θi = θ1,a n dl e tΠO






















β−1 if Y< Y ∗
c1,
(X+θ1)Y
r−α − W1 − K if Y ∗
c1 ≤ Y.
(13)
(ii) Let Y ∗
c2 denote the optimal trigger for the commencement of the project when θi = θ2,
and let ΠO
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r−α − S − CF
if Y< Y ∗
c2,
if Y ∗





Several comments about this proposition are in order. First, if θi = θ1, the owner does
not start the project until the ﬁrst time that Y reaches the trigger Y ∗
c1. Similarly, if θi =
θ2, the owner neither starts the project until Y ﬁrst hits the trigger Y ∗
c2 nor replaces the
manager until Y ﬁrst hits the trigger Y ∗
r . The intuitive reason is similar to that given
below Proposition 2. Second, because the higher Y ∗
ci corresponds to the commencement
option being exercised at a later time, the higher Y ∗
ci implies that the project starts later.
Third, an increase in W1 (or W2) increases the noncommitment trigger point of Y ∗
c1 (or
Y ∗
c2). Because the owner cannot be committed to the ex ante promised commencement
triggers, she regards the success reward W1 (or the non-success reward W2) as a sunk cost
at the start of the project in addition to the setup cost K. Thus, the owner delays the
start of the project if W1 (or W2) increases.
4.2. The owner’s maximization problem at time zero.–
Now, it follows that the owner’s option value is ΠO
c1 (Y ) given by (13) if θi = θ1,a n d
ΠO
c2(Y ) given by (15) if θi = θ2. Conditional on the incumbent manager making investment


























Note that the owner makes the ﬁxed base payment W0 at time zero.
The manager’s option with respect to the commencement of the project for each θi has
ap a y o ﬀ function of Wi, whereas his option with respect to his replacement has a payoﬀ























+ W0 − CE.
(17)
Note that the manager receives W0,a n di n c u r st h ee ﬀort cost CE at time zero when he
invests h = H.
Because the owner’s and manager’s option values at time zero are expressed by (16)
and (17) and the triggers (Y ∗
r ,Y∗
c1,Y∗
c2) are provided by (10), (12) and (14), the owner’s




O (Y0,q H) given by (16), (18)





































































W0 ≥ 0,W 1 ≥ 0,W 2 ≥ 0,S≥ 0. (LL)
Here, (IC) is the incentive compatibility constraint for the incumbent manager, which
ensures that he prefers to invest h = H rather than h = L.N o t i c et h a tb yc h o o s i n gh = H,
16For simplicity, we neglect the nonnegativity constraints of Yc1, Yc2 and Yr.T h ed i ﬀerence between
this problem and the standard contract problem is that the owner’s and manager’s payoﬀsa r ee v a l u a t e d
at the present value operator, and that the present value operator depends on the compensation contract.
20the manager may receive the higher expected present value of compensation, but incurs
the eﬀort cost CE. (IR) is the individual rationality constraint for the incumbent manager,
which guarantees that the option value to him of accepting the contract is greater than
or equal to the investment cost. Note that the individual rationality constraint for the
new manager is always satisﬁed because he receives zero wages and incurs no investment
or replacement costs. (TR) is the constraint for the triggers Yc2 and Yr,w h i c hi n d i c a t e s
that replacement of the incumbent manager does not occur before the project is started.




2,S∗) denote the solution to problem (18).
4.3. The optimal contract and trigger strategies.–
To characterize the solution to problem (18), we simplify the problem by presenting the
following lemmas.
Lemma 1: Under Assumption 1, W∗
1 > 0.
Lemma 2: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, (IC) is always binding if (IR) is binding.
Lemma 3: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, (IC) is always binding if (TR) is binding.
L e m m a1s h o w st h a tW∗
1 must be positive in order to motivate the manager to choose
h = H under Assumption 1. Lemma 2 implies that (IR) is not binding if (IC) is not
binding. The intuition for Lemma 2 is that if (IR) is binding while (IC) is not binding,
the optimal solution involves W∗
1 = W∗
2 = S∗ =0 , which contradicts Lemma 1 under
Assumption 1. Finally, Lemma 3 suggests that (TR) is not binding if (IC) is not binding.
The intuition for Lemma 3 is that W∗
1 can be adjusted so that (IC) is always binding
whenever (TR) is binding.
Now, using Lemmas 1—3, we obtain the following proposition.










































∗ =0 . (21)
The optimal triggers (Y ∗
r ,Y∗
c1,Y∗
























c2) are still characterized by part (i) of this
proposition. Furthermore, W∗




















CL + CE ≥ 0. (23)
(b) If S∗ > 0, then (W∗
1,W∗





















2 =0 ; (25)
and (W∗






[β − (1 − qH)]W∗



















∗ − CL)+CE > 0, (27a)
22or
S










0 =0 . (27b)
The optimal triggers (Y ∗
r ,Y∗
c1,Y∗




Corollary to Proposition 5: Suppose that Assumptions 1—3 hold.
(i) Suppose that (19) holds. Then, Y ∗
c1 >YFB
c1 , Y ∗
c2 = Y FB
c2 ,a n dY ∗
r <YFB
r .
(ii) Suppose that (22) holds. Then, Y ∗
c1 >YFB
c1 , Y ∗
c2 = Y FB
c2 ,a n dY ∗
r <YFB
r . In addition,
S∗ <C L.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows.17 Suppose that the cost—beneﬁt




∆q, divided by the cost of the loss
of corporate control compared with the likelihood of success when the manager does not
invest,
CL
qL ,i ss u ﬃciently large (that is, (19) holds). This corresponds to the case in
which the manager has great incentives to avoid incurring the investment cost, but not
much incentive to avoid being replaced; in other words, there is a severe moral hazard
problem. In this case, using Lemmas 1—3 under Assumptions 1 and 2, the owner only
needs to consider (IC) with (LL) of W2 and S to maximize her option value at time
zero. Indeed, setting W2 = S =0maximizes the owner’s option value at time zero for
any W0 ≥ 0 and W1 > 0 because a decline in W2 (or S)d e c r e a s e st h es u n kc o s ta tt h e
start of the project (or at the replacement of the manager) from the owner’s ex post
viewpoint and thereby reduces the commencement trigger of the lower-quality project (or
the replacement trigger).18 Similarly, setting W2 = S =0relaxes (IC) to the largest extent
for any W1 > 0 because the manager then has the greatest incentive to invest h = H for
17The intuition behind the corollary of this proposition will be provided later, together with the intuition
behind Proposition 7.













< 0 using (10).
23any W1 > 0.19 Note that the replacement trigger also becomes an important incentive
device because it directly aﬀects the loss of the option value to the manager at the loss







These arguments show that it is optimal for the owner to set W∗
2 = S∗ =0 . Because (IC)
must be binding under the case of Assumptions 1 and 2 where the ex ante moral hazard
problem exists and the dismissal loss for the owner is relatively large, W∗
1 is determined
by the binding (IC) for W∗
2 = S∗ =0 , that is, (20). For such (W∗
1,W∗
2,S∗), the owner











qL is smaller (that is, (22) holds), so that the moral
hazard problem is not severe. Then, the owner needs to consider (IR) in addition to
the (IC) and (LL) of W2 and S when maximizing her option value at time zero. In
this case, because the owner must compensate the manager for the loss of his option






CL, through W0 in order to induce the
manager to participate in the contract relation, the owner has an incentive to minimize
this compensation by raising Y ∗
r t h r o u g ha ni n c r e a s ei nS. However, such increases in
S and Y ∗
r raise W1 and Y ∗
c1 by making (IC) more stringent. If the former income eﬀect
of a decline in W0 is dominated by the latter incentive eﬀect, the optimal severance pay
S∗ must be set equal to zero. Then, the results under (19) still hold, although W∗
0 must
b ep o s i t i v eb e c a u s e( I R )i sb i n d i n g .I nc o n t r a s t ,i ft h ef o r m e ri n c o m ee ﬀect of a decline
in W0 dominates the latter incentive eﬀect, the optimal severance pay S∗ must then be
positive. In this case, S∗ must be smaller than the cost of the loss of corporate control
incurred by the manager, CL.H o w e v e r ,t h ee ﬀects of W1 and W2 are similar to those in
t h ec a s eo f( 1 9 ) .H e n c e ,W∗
2 =0 . In addition, if W∗
0 > 0,t h e n(W∗
1,S∗) are simultaneously
determined by their ﬁrst-order conditions and (IC) for W∗
2 =0 . Thus, (24) and (26a)
hold. On the other hand, if W∗
0 =0 ,t h e n(W∗
1,S∗) are simultaneously determined by





















Then, it follows from (10) that Φ(W1,0,0) ≥ Φ(W1,W 2,S) for any W1 > 0 and any (W2,S) ≥ (0,0).
24(IC) and (IR) for W∗
0 = W∗






c2) are still given by (10), (12) and (14), respectively.
As an illustration, consider the parametric case in which r =0 .05, α =0 .03, σ =0 .2,
K =1 0 0 , CF =2 0 , CL =3 0 , CE =1 2 , X =4 , θ1 =0 .5, θ2 = −0.5, qH =0 .4 and qL =
0.1.T h er i s k - f r e er a t er, the drift term α and the standard deviation σ follow Dixit and
Pindyck (1994). We set the cost parameters (K,CF,C L,C E) so that K is considerably
larger than any of (CF,C L,C E).T h e r e v e n u e p a r a m e t e r s (X,θ1,θ2) and the success
probability (qH,q L) are chosen to satisfy our assumptions for (K,CF,C L,C E). Because














≤ Y0, we can neglect the case of Y0 ≤ 0.69312. Table 1 indicates the three possibilities




2,S∗) and ΠO (Y0,q H) that correspond to the case of Proposition
5(ii)(a). Note that in this case, W∗




ΠO (Y0,q H) that correspond to the case of Proposition 5(ii)(b) when (W∗
0,S∗) are given by




and ΠO (Y0,q H) that correspond to the case of Proposition 5(ii)(b) when (W∗
0,S∗) are
given by (26b) and (27b). Note that W∗
2 =0in the former case, whereas W∗
0 = W∗
2 =0in
the latter case. In addition, S∗ in Table 1B for any value of Y0 ≥ 2.2 is calculated by (26a0)
in Appendix B instead of (26a) because Y0 ≥ Y ∗
c1 in these values of Y0.N o w ,c o m p a r i n g
ΠO (Y0,q H) for the three cases at each Y0, we indicate that the optimal compensation
contract involves S∗ > 0 for any Y0 listed in Table 1.
4.4. Comparison of the solution under the noncommitment timing case
with the solution under the commitment timing case and with the ﬁrst-best
solution.–
To compare the solution under the noncommitment timing case with that under the





c1 <Y 0 or Y ∗
c2 <Y 0,w ec a ns e tY ∗
c1 = Y0 or Y ∗
c2 = Y0. Even in this case, only (16) and (26a)
need to be modiﬁed, whereas the remaining results are unchanged; see Appendix B.
25and optimal trigger levels (Y ∗∗
r ,Y∗∗
c1 ,Y∗∗
c2 ) under the commitment timing case. To simplify







K > − θ2
X+θ2.
Then, using the results of Hori and Osano (2009), we obtain the following proposition.














, then the optimal triggers are Y ∗∗
c1 =
Y FB
c1 , Y ∗∗
c2 = Y FB








r . The optimal compensation
































CL, then the optimal triggers are Y ∗∗
c1 =
Y FB
c1 , Y ∗∗
c2 = Y FB
c2 ,a n dY ∗∗
r ≤ Y FB
r .F u r t h e r m o r e ,W∗∗
1 > 0 and W∗∗
2 = S∗∗
2 =0 .
Now, using Propositions 5 and 6 with the Corollary to Proposition 5, the following
proposition is established.
Proposition 7: Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 0 and 3 hold.
(i) Suppose that (19) holds.
(a) Y ∗
c1 >Y∗∗
c1 = Y FB
c1 and Y ∗
c2 = Y ∗∗















,t h e nY ∗∗
r <Y ∗
r <Y FB
r .O t h e r w i s e ,
Y ∗
r is smaller than Y FB
r , but can be larger or smaller than Y ∗∗
r .
(c) W∗
1 > 0, W∗∗
1 > 0,a n d(W∗
2,S∗)=( W∗∗
2 ,S∗∗)=( 0 ,0).
(ii) Suppose that (22) holds. Then, the results of part (i) still hold, except that (a) Y ∗
r is
smaller than Y FB
r ,b u tc a nb el a r g e ro rs m a l l e rt h a nY ∗∗
r ,a n d( b )S∗ > 0 may hold.
If the owner cannot precommit to the commencement or replacement trigger promised
before the manager chooses h = H or L, the owner must design the optimal compensation
contract (W∗
1,W∗
2,S∗) by considering its eﬀects on the ex post determination of the trigger
levels of (Y ∗
r ,Y∗
c1,Y∗
c2). Suppose that there is a severe moral hazard problem ((19) holds) so
that (IR) is never binding. Then, the owner pays the success reward (W∗
1 > 0), but does
not pay the non-success reward or the severance pay (W∗
2 = S∗ =0 ). After the manager
chooses the level of investment for (W∗
1,W∗
2,S∗), the owner determines the commencement
26and replacement triggers. In comparison with the ﬁrst-best case, the owner starts the
higher-quality project later, while commencing the lower-quality project at the same ﬁrst-
best time, and she replaces the incumbent manager earlier. By comparison with the
commitment timing strategy, she launches the higher-quality project later, although she
launches the lower-quality project at the same time as the ﬁrst-best case. The owner also
replaces the incumbent manager later under the noncommitment timing strategy if the














Next, suppose that the moral hazard problem is not severe ((22) holds) so that (IR)
is binding. The results of the commencement triggers in this case are similar to those
in the case of (19). On the other hand, the owner not only pays the success reward but
may also pay the severance pay, although she never pays the non-success reward. As the
severance pay increases the owner’s sunk cost at the replacement of the manager from her
ex post viewpoint, she wants to replace the incumbent manager even later. In fact, in this
parametric case, the owner need not rely heavily on the replacement trigger in order to
motivate the manager to choose the higher level of investment if the owner can precommit
to her timing strategy. Hence, the owner may replace the incumbent manager earlier under
the noncommitment timing case than under the commitment case. Irrespective of which
result is obtained, under the noncommitment timing case, the optimal severance pay must
be smaller than the loss of the option value to the manager at his replacement, as shown
in (ii) of the Corollary to Proposition 5. Thus, the owner never replaces the incumbent
manager later than the ﬁrst-best replacement timing.
The theoretical implications and intuitions about this proposition are discussed as fol-
lows. First, Proposition 7 shows that the higher-quality project is launched later under
the noncommitment timing case than under both the ﬁrst-best case and the commitment
timing case, regardless of the severity of the manager’s moral hazard problem. Although
the owner incurs the success reward as a sunk cost at the start of the project in addition
to the setup cost, she need not regard the success reward as an additional sunk cost from
her ex post viewpoint under both the ﬁrst-best and commitment timing strategies because
27in these two cases the compensation contract is not considered or is determined simul-
taneously with the trigger strategies at time 0 before the manager chooses the level of
investment. By contrast, the owner must regard the success reward as an additional sunk
cost under the noncommitment timing case because she determines the commencement
trigger of the higher-quality project after the manager chooses the level of investment.
Hence, as the owner utilizes the success reward in order to motivate the manager to select
the higher level of investment, the option value of waiting to launch the project is even
larger from her ex post viewpoint under the noncommitment timing case. Thus, the owner
is forced to delay the start of the higher-quality project under the noncommitment timing
case. These results are in contrast to those attained not only in the case of “hidden action
only” in Grenadier and Wang (2005), where the project quality is publicly observable, but
also in Hori and Osano (2009). The two studies indicate that the higher-quality project
is started at the same time as for the ﬁrst-best case.
This diﬀerence depends on the fact that the present paper deals with the case in which
the owner cannot precommit to the commencement trigger promised before the manager
chooses investment, whereas the other two papers investigate the case in which the owner
can do so. Hence, in the present paper, the owner is forced to start the higher-quality
project after the ﬁrst-best timing as long as she must use the success reward as an incentive
device for the manager. By contrast, in the other two papers, it is always eﬃcient for
the owner to start the higher-quality project at the same time as for the ﬁrst-best case
b e c a u s es h ec a nb ec o m m i t t e dt ot h ec o m m e n c e m e n tt r i g g e ro ft h eh i g h e r - q u a l i t yp r o j e c t
even after the manager chooses the level of investment.
Second, Proposition 7 suggests that regardless of the severity of the manager’s moral
hazard problem, the lower-quality project is launched under the noncommitment timing
c a s ea tt h es a m et i m ea sf o rt h eﬁrst-best case, which is exactly the same as that under
the commitment timing case. Irrespective of whether the owner can precommit to the
commitment trigger, she never utilizes the nonsuccess reward. This is because the nonsuc-
cess reward forces the manager to choose the lower level of investment. As the nonsuccess
28reward is set equal to zero, the optimal commencement trigger of the lower-quality project
is set equal to the ﬁrst-best one. This result is the same as that in the model of “hidden
action only” in Grenadier and Wang (2005) and in Hori and Osano (2009).
Third, Proposition 7 indicates that the incumbent manager is replaced earlier under
the noncommitment timing case than under the ﬁrst-best case. Proposition 7 also shows
that the incumbent manager is replaced later under the noncommitment timing case than
under the commitment case if the manager’s moral hazard problem is severe enough, but
not necessarily if the manager’s moral hazard problem is not severe enough. Hence, the
result of the replacement trigger in the present model is diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a ta t t a i n e di n
Hori and Osano (2009), in which the owner can be committed to the replacement trigger.
Under the noncommitment trigger case, the owner must regard the severance pay as
an additional sunk cost when determining the replacement trigger after the manager
chooses the level of investment. However, if the manager’s moral hazard problem is
severe, she never utilizes the severance pay that forces the manager to choose the lower
level of investment. In fact, even if the severance pay is set equal to zero, the optimal
replacement trigger is lower than the ﬁrst-best trigger because the replacement trigger,
as well as the manager’s reward for success, is used as an incentive device to motivate the
manager to choose the higher level of investment. This is because the earlier replacement
directly increases the loss of the option value to the manager at the loss of corporate
control. Thus, whether the owner can or cannot precommit to the replacement trigger,
the optimal replacement trigger is lower than the ﬁrst-best trigger because the earlier
replacement serves to motivate the manager to select the higher level of investment.
However, if the manager’s moral hazard problem is severe enough, the optimal replace-
ment trigger under the commitment timing case is set too low from the owner’s viewpoint
after the manager selects the level of investment. Thus, it is very costly from the owner’s
ex post viewpoint to exercise the replacement trigger at such a low level because she
incurs the dismissal cost as a sunk cost at the replacement of the manager. Hence, the
optimal replacement trigger is higher under the noncommitment timing case than under
29the commitment case if the manager’s moral hazard problem is severe enough. On the
other hand, if the manager’s moral hazard problem is not severe enough, the optimal
replacement trigger under the commitment timing strategy may be too high from the
owner’s ex post viewpoint. This implies that, from the owner’s ex post viewpoint, replac-
ing the incumbent manager earlier may be more desirable. Then, it is possible that the
incumbent manager is replaced earlier under the noncommitment timing case than under
the commitment case.
If the manager’s moral hazard problem is not severe, the owner must consider the
constraint of (IR). Then, the owner may compensate the manager for the loss of his
option value on his replacement through his ﬁxed base salary, thereby inducing him to
participate in the contract relation. However, the owner may also utilize the severance
pay to the manager, because an increase in the severance pay can decrease the ﬁxed
base salary by reducing the manager’s option value compensation through an increase in
the replacement trigger. As the severance pay is an additional sunk cost, the optimal
replacement trigger may be even higher under the noncommitment timing case. However,
under the commitment timing case, the owner need not heavily rely on the replacement
trigger as an incentive device in this parametric situation, thereby raising the optimal
replacement trigger. Therefore, the optimal replacement trigger may be higher under the
commitment timing case than under the noncommitment case.
Finally, the severance pay can be positive under the noncommitment timing strategy
if the manager’s moral hazard problem is not severe. This result is in contrast to that
attained in Hori and Osano (2009), in which the severance pay must be set equal to zero.
A st h eo w n e rc a nb ec o m m i t t e dt ot h ee xa n t ep r o m i s e dt r i g g e r si nH o r ia n dO s a n o ,
she need not consider the eﬀect of the compensation contract on the replacement trigger.
Hence, taking the replacement trigger level as given, the owner only needs to ﬁxt h e
severance pay at zero. The reason for this is that an increase in severance pay decreases
the owner’s option value at time zero, whereas it tightens the incentive compatibility
constraint for the manager. Under the limited liability constraint, severance pay must
30be minimized and set equal to zero. By contrast, in the present model, the owner must
consider the eﬀect of the compensation contract on the replacement trigger because she
cannot be committed to the ex ante promised triggers. In the absence of severance pay, the
owner may have an ex post incentive to replace the manager earlier after he chooses the
level of investment. However, if the owner has an incentive to minimize the compensation
for the manager’s loss of control, she needs to delay the replacement trigger, thereby
reducing the compensation for the manager’s loss of option value on his replacement.
Hence, the owner may utilize the severance pay that forces her to replace the manager
later. This ﬁnding suggests that severance pay plays the role of committing the owner
to replacing the manager later and of reducing the manager’s option value compensation
on his replacement in order to alleviate his disincentive to participate in the contract
relation.
In a static model of boards of directors, Almazan and Suarez (2003) suggest that sever-
ance pay serves to moderate the temptations of the party with residual control rights on
the replacement decision to behave opportunistically against the other. More speciﬁcally,
in strong boards, severance pay protects the CEO from the shareholders’ tendency to
replace him unnecessarily, whereas in weak boards, severance pay protects shareholders
from the CEO’s tendency to resist his own fully justiﬁed replacement. Thus, severance
pay may be a more eﬃcient and cheaper instrument for providing eﬀort incentives than
the on-the-job incentive pay. As a result, in Almazan and Suarez, the role of the sev-
erance pay depends on both the owner’s and manager’s replacement incentives, and the
manager’s eﬀort incentives. Similarly, Inderst and Mueller (2006) indicate that severance
pay reduces the manager’s incentive to entrench himself so that it prevents an irreversible
investment that reduces the ﬁrm’s future value under a potential successor.21
In a model of optimal termination of a long-term contract, Spear and Wang (2005)
show that the agent must be dismissed when he produces a bad output and becomes too
poor to be punished eﬀectively or when he becomes too rich to be motivated to work
21Shleifer and Vishny (1989) also informally suggest that the severance pay prevents many entrenching
investments.
31diligently. In the ﬁrst case, the principal needs to make no severance payment, whereas in
the second case, the principal needs to make a severance payment in order to compensate
the agent for his exogenous promised utility. In the second case, the principal replaces
the incumbent agent with a new agent because motivating the incumbent agent is too
costly. As the second case happens when the agent’s utility has an income eﬀect, the role
of severance pay in Spear and Wang depends on the degree of risk aversion of the agent.
Unlike these studies, in the present paper, the owner who cannot precommit to the ex
ante promised replacement trigger may use a positive severance payment to induce herself
to choose a later replacement of the manager if the manager’s moral hazard problem is
not severe. Severance pay then serves to reduce the loss of the manager’s option value
on replacement through an increase in the replacement trigger, thereby minimizing the
compensation for the manager’s loss of corporate control. In addition, in our model, the
role of severance pay does not depend on the degree of risk aversion of the manager.
5. Conclusion
Given the owner’s noncommitment timing strategy and the manager’s moral hazard
problem, this article has examined how the optimal compensation contract is designed
and how the corresponding timing decisions to launch the project and replace the manager
are determined. Using the real options approach, we show that in comparison with the
ﬁrst-best case, the higher-quality project is launched later, although the lower-quality
project is launched at the same time as the ﬁrst-best case, and the incumbent manager
is replaced earlier. Furthermore, we also indicate that, compared with the commitment
timing case, the higher-quality project is launched later, whereas the incumbent manager
is (or is not necessarily) replaced later if the manager’s moral hazard problem is severe
enough (or not severe enough). Unlike the folklore result of the standard moral hazard
model, severance pay can play the role of committing the owner to replacing the incumbent
manager later in order to reduce the compensation to the manager for the loss of his option
value for loss of corporate control if the severity of the manager’s moral hazard problem
32is not great.
33Appendix A
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :It follows from (2) and (3) that dR = αRdt + σRdz. Thus, us-
ing Ito’s Lemma, Vr (Y ) satisﬁes the diﬀerential equation 1
2σ2Y 2VrY Y (Y )+αYV rY (Y ) −
rVr (Y )=0 ,w h e r eVrY = dVr/dY , VrY Y = d2Vr/d2Y ,a n dVr (0) = 0.22 Ruling out a spec-
ulative bubble and using Vr (0) = 0, we can show that the solution is determined by Vr (Y )









Let Fc2 (Y ) (Fr (Y )) denote the expected present value of the ﬁrm before (after)t h e
incumbent manager with θ2 is replaced. The standard procedure (see Dixit and Pindyck
(1994)) shows that Fc2 (Y )=
(X+θ2)Y
r−α and Fr (Y )= XY
r−α.N o t et h a tFc2 (Y ) > 0 and Fr (Y )
> 0 from r>α. The replacement of the manager is equivalent to investing in a project
with the value of Fr (Y ), while incurring CF + CL, and abandoning a project with the
value of Fc2 (Y ).23 This implies that the ﬁrm pays CF + CL and invests in a project with
the value of ∆2F (Y ),w h e r e∆2F (Y ) ≡ Fr (Y ) − Fc2 (Y ).T h u s ,∆2F (Y ) is written as
∆2F (Y )=−θ2Y
r−α .
















dY .T h e ﬁrst boundary condition is the value-matching condition,





− CF − CL at the date at which
the option is exercised. The second boundary condition is the smooth-pasting condition,
which ensures that the exercise trigger is chosen to maximize the owner’s option value.
C o m b i n i n gt h e s et w oc o n d i t i o n sw i t hVr (Y )=ArY β, we can derive (4) and (5), given in
Proposition 1. k
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : (i) Again, Vc1 (Y ) equals Ac1Y β,w h e r eAc1 is a positive

















dY ,w h e r eFc1(Y )=
(X+θ1)Y
r−α ,a s
22Vr (Y ) satisﬁes the following Bellman equation: Vr (Y )=E[Vr (Y + dY)e−rdt],w h e r eE is the
expectation operator. Expanding the right-hand side of this equation with Ito’s Lemma and rearranging
it as dt → 0, we obtain the diﬀerential equation introduced here.
23Note that under the ﬁrst-best solution, the incumbent manager is compensated for the loss of CL.
34argued in the proof of Proposition 1. Note that at the start of the project, the owner





after paying the exercise price K.W h e nθi =
θ1, the manager is not dismissed after the start of the project. Then, combining the two
boundary conditions with Vc1 (Y )=Ac1Y β, we can prove (6) and (7).

















dY ,w h e r eFc2(Y )=
(X+θ2)Y
r−α ,a sa r g u e di nt h e
proof of Proposition 1. When θi = θ2, the manager needs to be replaced the ﬁrst time
that Y hits the trigger level Y FB
r . Given this, repeating a similar derivation procedure as
that of (4)—(7), we can show (8) and (9). Note that Y FB
c2 <YFB
r from Assumption 2. k
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :As argued in the proof of Proposition 1, ΠO
r (Y ) satisﬁes
the diﬀerential equation 1
2σ2Y 2ΠO
rYY (Y )+αY ΠO
rY (Y ) − rΠO
r (Y )=0 ,w h e r eΠO
rY =
dΠO
r /dY , ΠO
rY Y = d2ΠO
r /d2Y ,a n dΠO
r (0) = 0.24 Ruling out a speculative bubble and
using ΠO
r (0) = 0, we can show that the solution is determined by ΠO
r (Y )=BrY β,w h e r e
Br is a positive constant parameter.
Let Gc2 (Y ) (Gr (Y )) denote the expected present value of the ﬁrm before (after)t h e
incumbent manager with θ2 is replaced. The standard procedure (see Dixit and Pindyck
(1994)) shows that Gc2 (Y )=
(X+θ2)Y
r−α and Gr (Y )= XY
r−α.N o t e t h a t Gc2 (Y ) > 0 and
Gr (Y ) > 0 from r>α. The replacement of the manager is equivalent to investing in a
project with the value of Gr (Y ), while incurring S + CF, and abandoning a project with
the value of Gc2 (Y ). This implies that the ﬁrm pays S + CF and invests in a project




The boundary conditions in this problem are ΠO
r (Y ∗
r )=∆2G(Y ∗







dY .T h eﬁrst boundary condition is the value-matching condition, while
the second boundary condition is the smooth-pasting condition. Combining these two
conditions with ΠO
r (Y )=BrY β, we can derive (10) and (11), given in Proposition 3. k
24ΠO
r (Y ) satisﬁes the following Bellman equation: ΠO
r (Y )=E[ΠO
r (Y + dY)e−rdt],w h e r eE is the
expectation operator. Expanding the right-hand side of this equation with Ito’s Lemma and rearranging
it as dt → 0, we obtain the diﬀerential equation introduced here.
35P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 : (i) Again, ΠO
c1 (Y ) equals Bc1Y β,w h e r eBc1 is a positive











dY ,w h e r eGc1(Y )=
(X+θ1)Y
r−α ,a s
argued in the proof of Proposition 1. Note that at the start of the project, the owner
receives the value of the project Gc1 (Y ∗
c1) after paying the exercise price W1 + K.W h e n
θi = θ1, the manager is not dismissed after the start of the project. Then, combining the
two boundary conditions with ΠO
c1 (Y )=Bc1Y β, we can prove (12) and (13).











dY ,w h e r eGc2(Y )=
(X+θ2)Y
r−α ,a sa r g u e di nt h ep r o o fo f
Proposition 1. When θi = θ2, the manager needs to be replaced the ﬁr s tt i m et h a tY
hits the trigger level Y ∗
r . Given this, repeating a similar derivation procedure as that of
(10)—(13), we can show (14) and (15). k
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :Suppose that W∗
1 =0 .A sw ec a na s s u m eY ∗
r >Y 0 without loss of
generality, it follows from Assumption 1 with qH >q L that (IC) is violated. k


















































36Partially diﬀerentiating b ΠO (Y0,q H) with respect to W1 and W2 using (12) and (14) yields






























Hence, W1 = W2 =0maximizes b ΠO (Y0,q H) under (LL) for any S ≥ 0.N o t et h a t( I R )
c o n t i n u e st ob eb i n d i n gf o rW1 = W2 =0because W0 is adjusted in accordance with
(A1). As W1 and W2 decrease, W0 ≥ 0 also continues to hold as long as (IR) and W0 ≥

















where the last inequality is obtained from Assumption 2. Hence, W1 = W2 =0satisﬁes
(TR) for any S ≥ 0 under Assumption 2. These ﬁndings imply that an optimal solution to
(18) involves W1 = W2 =0as long as (IR) is binding while (IC) is not binding. However,
W∗
1 =0contradicts the result of Lemma 1. Therefore, (IR) is not binding if (IC) is not
binding, which veriﬁes the statement of this lemma. k
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose that (IC) is not binding. Under Assumptions 1 and 2,
it follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 that W∗
1 > 0 and that (IR) is not binding. In addition,
it also follows from (16) that
∂ΠO(Y0,qH)






< 0 using (14), and that
∂ΠO(Y0,qH)






< 0 using (10). Thus, it is optimal to set W2 = S =
0. Now, it follows from (10) and (14) that (TR) is not binding for W2 = S =0under
Assumption 2. Hence, the statement of this lemma is proved. k
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :(i) Suppose that (19) holds. We begin to solve problem (18)
by dropping (IR) and (TR). After the solution under this assumption is obtained, we
check whether the obtained solution satisﬁes (IR) and (TR). Because Lemmas 2 and 3
ensure that (IC) is always binding if either (IR) or (TR) is binding, we need not consider
37the case in which (IR) or (TR) or both are binding while (IC) is not binding. Hence, the
solution obtained is a solution to problem (18) if it satisﬁes (IR) and (TR).
First, let us notice that the solution must satisfy W∗
1 > 0 from Lemma 1. Furthermore,
we can show that W∗
2 = S∗ =0 . This result can be derived as follows. It follows from the
proof of Lemma 3 that
∂ΠO(Y0,qH)
∂W2 < 0 and
∂ΠO(Y0,qH)





















− CE. Then, it follows
from (10) that Φ(W1,0,0) ≥ Φ(W1,W 2,S) for any W1 > 0 and for any (W2,S) ≥ (0,0).
These ﬁndings imply that setting (W2,S) equal to (0,0) maximizes (18) subject to (IC),
W2 ≥ 0 and S ≥ 0 for any W0 ≥ 0 and W1 > 0. Hence, we can set W∗
2 = S∗ =0 .
Now, we solve problem (18) by dropping (IR) and (TR) under W∗
2 = S∗ =0 . Then,








< 0 that W1 = W2 = S =0becomes the solution, which contradicts Lemma 1. Thus,
W∗
1 is determined by (20). Because Y ∗
r >Y 0 without loss of generality, it follows from
Assumption 1 that W∗
1 > 0.25 As
∂ΠO(Y0,qH)
∂W0 < 0, it is also immediate that W∗
0 =0if (IR)
can be neglected. Given W∗
2 = S∗ =0 ,w ev e r i f y( 2 1 ) .






























where the last inequality is derived from (19) with (10) and (21). Hence, (IR) is satisﬁed.
It also follows from (10), (14) and (21) that (TR) is satisﬁed under Assumption 2.
(ii) Suppose that (22) holds. Again, given Lemmas 2 and 3, we begin to solve problem
(18) by dropping (IR) and (TR). Applying the same procedure as that of part (i) in the
























qH−qL ≥ 0.A s
∂ΠO(Y0,qH)









qH−qL,w h i c hm e a n s
that (IR) is binding. Hence, this is a contradiction.
Thus, in this parametric case, we may solve problem (18) by letting (IC) and (TR)
bind while dropping (IR) or letting (IC) and (IR) bind while dropping (TR). However,





∂S < 0, Φ(W1,0,0) ≥ Φ(W1,W 2,S) for any W1 > 0 and
for any (W2,S) ≥ (0,0), and (TR) is satisﬁed for (10), (14) and (W2,S)=( 0 ,0) under
Assumption 2. Because (TR) is not binding for W2 = S =0 , this is a contradiction.
Hence, we can neglect the former case, and focus on the latter case. Then, W∗
0 is derived
from (A1) because (IR) is binding. Hence, the objective function is expressed by (A2)
instead of (16). After the solution under this assumption is obtained, we check whether
the solution obtained satisﬁes (TR).
First, let us again notice that W∗
1 > 0 f r o mL e m m a1 .W en e x ts h o wW∗
2 =0 , because
∂ΠO(Y0,qH)
∂W2 < 0 from (A4) and because Φ(W1,0,S) ≥ Φ(W1,W 2,S) for any W1 > 0 and for
any (W2,S) ≥ (0,0).A st h i si m p l i e st h a tW2 =0maximizes (18) subject to (IC), (IR)
and W2 ≥ 0 for any W0 ≥ 0, W1 > 0 and S ≥ 0,w ec a ns e tW∗
2 =0 ,w h i c hv e r i ﬁes (25).
Now, the ﬁrst-order conditions to problem (18) with respect to W1 and S in this case














































λ3 are the nonnegative multipliers associated with (IC), W∗
0 ≥ 0
and S∗ ≥ 0.
If W∗
0 > 0 and S∗ > 0,t h a ti s ,λ2 = λ3 =0 , it follows from (A6) and (A7) that
the equality of (26a) holds. Because (IC) is binding, (W∗
1,S∗) are then simultaneously
39determined by (24) and (26a). Note that the inequality of (24) is veriﬁed because (A6)






qH+λ1(qH−qL) > 0.G i v e n ( A 1 ) f o r W∗
2 =0 , W∗
0 in this
case is determined by (27a). To prove the inequality of (26a), suppose that S∗ ≥ CL.







(S∗ − CL) −
qLCE
qH−qL < 0,
which is a contradiction. This means that S∗ <C L,w h i c hv e r i ﬁes the inequality of (26a).
Furthermore, it follows from (10), (14) and (25) that (TR) is satisﬁed under Assumption
2.
If W∗
0 =0and S∗ > 0,t h e n(W∗
1,S∗) are given by (IC) and W∗
0 =0because (IC)
is binding. Thus, given (A1), (W∗
1,S∗) are then simultaneously determined by (24) and
(26b). Note that the inequality of (24) is veriﬁed by substituting (26b) into (24). As W∗
0
=0 , (27b) is immediate. Furthermore, it follows from (10), (14) and (25) that (TR) is
satisﬁed under Assumption 2.
If S∗ =0 ,t h e nW∗
2 = S∗ =0 . Because (IC) is binding, (W∗
1,W∗
2,S∗) are determined by
(20) and W∗
2 = S∗ =0 . As (IR) is also binding, it follows from (A1) that W∗
0 is determined
by (23). The inequality of (23) follows from (10), (20), (22) and S∗ =0 . Then, it follows
from (10), (14) and W∗
2 =0that (TR) is satisﬁed under Assumption 2. k
Proof of Corollary to Proposition 5: (i) The statement of part (i) is evident from
(4), (6), (8), (10), (12), (14), (20) and (21).
(ii) The statement of part (ii) is evident from (4), (6), (8), (10), (12), (14), (20), (21) and
(24)—(26). k
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :Under the parametric case of Assumptions 1, 20 and 3, Propo-
sition 2 of Hori and Osano (2009) gives the optimal compensation contract and optimal
triggers if the owner can precommit to the ex ante promised triggers. Although the present
model includes the ﬁxed base salary W0 in the compensation contract, the role of W0 only
increases ΠO (Y0,q H) by relaxing (IR). In fact, in the solution given by Proposition 2 of









−θ2 (CF + CL)
i−β
.
Because W0 h a sn or o l ei nt h i sr e g i o n ,t h es t a t e m e n to fp a r t( i )o ft h i sp r o p o s i t i o ni s












CL, (IR) must be binding in the solution
given by Proposition 2 of Hori and Osano (2009). Then, if both (IC) and (IR) are
binding, (W∗∗
1 ,Y∗∗
r ) must be adjusted to satisfy that (IC) and (IR) are binding. This
causes a distortion that makes Y ∗∗
r lower than Y FB
r . Hence, by setting W0 positive, the
owner can relax (IR), thereby reducing the distortion of Y ∗∗
r and increasing ΠO (Y0,q H).







c2 ) by applying a procedure similar to that of Hori and Osano (2009). In
both cases, we must have W∗∗
1 > 0 and can set W∗∗
2 = S∗∗
2 =0without loss of generality.
Thus, the statement of part (ii) of this proposition is obtained. k
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 :( i )T h es t a t e m e n to fp a r t( i )i se v i d e n tf r o m( 4 ) ,( 6 ) ,( 8 ) ,( 1 0 ) ,
(12), (14), (20), (21) and Proposition 6.
(ii) The statement of part (ii) is evident from (4), (6), (8), (10), (12), (14), (20), (21),
















Note that we can set Y ∗
c1 = Y0 or Y ∗
c2 = Y0 if Y ∗
c1 <Y 0 or Y ∗
c2 <Y 0.N o w ,f o rt h ec a s eo f
Y ∗
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41Then, (A6) is reduced to
−qH + λ1(qH − qL) − λ2qH =0 . (A60)
Suppose that W∗























The remaining results for Proposition 5 are unchanged. k
42TABLE 1




2 S∗ ΠO (Y0,q H)
1.68 .3822 54.385 0 0 206.36
1.81 0 .517 36.097 0 0 246.00
2.01 2 .738 25.660 0 0 286.60
2.21 5 .038 18.858 0 0 328.34
2.41 7 .412 14.063 0 0 371.26
2.61 9 .857 10.502 0 0 415.34
2.82 2 .369 7.7549 0 0 460.54
3.02 4 .945 5.5738 0 0 506.84
3.22 7 .581 3.8023 0 0 554.20
3.43 0 .276 2.3365 0 0 602.58
3.63 3 .027 1.1051 0 0 651.94
1B. The case of Proposition 5(ii)(b) when (W∗
0,S∗) are given




2 S∗ ΠO (Y0,q H)
1.67 .4611 57.9 6 700 .77271 206.38
1.84 .5618 51.451 0 5.4718 246.58
2.02 .5354 44.6 3 909 .86600 288.04
2.21 4 .740 19.1 9 900 .15641 328.24
2.41 7 .078 14.3 6 800 .15641 369.52
2.61 9 .484 10.7 8 100 .15641 410.33
2.82 1 .957 8.0 1 5 300 .15641 450.82
3.02 4 .492 5.8 2 0 000 .15641 491.10
3.22 7 .088 4.0 3 7 300 .15641 531.21
3.42 9 .741 2.5 6 2 700 .15641 571.21
3.63 2 .449 1.3 2 3 900 .15641 611.13
1C. The case of Proposition 5(ii)(b) when (W∗
0,S∗) are given




2 S∗ ΠO (Y0,q H)
1.601 0 1 .77 0 11.839 204.61
1.806 7 .507 0 13.445 246.09
2.005 0 .809 0 14.832 287.91
2.204 0 .658 0 16.037 330.68
2.403 3 .784 0 17.092 374.56
2.602 8 .808 0 18.021 419.56
2.802 5 .039 0 18.844 465.68
3.002 2 .068 0 19.577 512.89
3.201 9 .713 0 20.233 566.6
3.401 7 .764 0 20.822 610.46
3.601 6 .139 0 21.354 660.74
Table 1A shows a compensation contract in the case of Proposition 5(ii)(a). Table 1B
shows a compensation contract in the case of Proposition 5(ii)(b) when (W∗
0,S∗) are given
by (26a) (or (26a0)) and (27a). Note that for Y0 < 2.2, (W∗
0,S∗) are given by (26a) and
(27a) because of Y ∗
c1 >Y 0,w h e r e a sf o rY0 ≥ 2.2, (W∗
0,S∗) are given by (26a0)a n d( 2 7 a )
because of Y ∗
c1 <Y 0. Table 1C shows a compensation contract in the case of Proposition
5(ii)(b) when (W∗
0,S∗) are given by (26b) and (27b).
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